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ALEXANDRA D. DAWSON· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
With the passage of the Jones Act l in 1963, Massachusetts be­
came the first state in the nation to protect wetlands by specific stat­
ute. Communities simultaneously were developing bylaws to protect 
wetlands and floodplains under the implied powers of the Zoning 
Enabling Act.2 Almost two decades of experience have generated a 
number oflegal decisions3 of interest to states that have enacted laws 
specifically protecting coastal wetlands4 and freshwater wetlands,5 
and to states that have, or are working on, plans under the Coastal 
Zone Management Act of 1972.6 
* B.A., Barnard College; J.D., Harvard University. The author is presently Direc­
tor, Resource Management and Administration Program, Antioch New England Gradu­
ate School and Executive Director, Water Supply Citizens Advisory Committee. 
1. Act of May 22, 1963, ch. 426, § 27A, 1963 Mass. Acts 240 (repealed 1972). 
2. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40A, §§ 1-17 (West 1979). 
3. E.g., MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals, 369 Mass. 512, 340 N.E.2d 487 (1976), 
Christoffels v. Alton Properties, Inc., 362 Mass. 862, 285 N.E.2d 453 (1972); Turnpike 
Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 362 Mass. 221, 284 N.E.2d 891 (1972), cert. denied,409 
U.S. 1108 (1973); Attorney General v. Baldwin, 361 Mass. 199, 279 N.E.2d 710 (1972); 
Golden v. Board of Selectmen, 358 Mass. 519, 265 N.E.2d 573 (1970); MacGibbon v. 
Board of Appeals, 356 Mass. 635, 255 N.E.2d 347 (1970); Bay State Lobster Co. v. Perini 
Corp., 355 Mass. 794, 245 N.E.2d 759 (1969); Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. 
Volpe & Co., 349 Mass. 104,206 N.E.2d 666 (1965); MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals, 
347 Mass. 690, 200 N.E.2d 254 (1964). 
4. See e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-28 to -45 (West 1975); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6601-6620,7001-7013 (1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 4701-4709 
(1974) (repealed 1975); MD. NAT. REC. CODE ANN. §§ 718-731 (Supp. 1970) (repealed 
1973); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 49-27-1 to -69 (Supp. 1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 483­
A:l to -5 (1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:9A-l to -10 (West 1979); N.Y. ENVIR. CONSERV. 
LAW §§ 25-0101 to -0601 (McKinney Supp. 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113-230 (1978); 
OR. REv. STAT. §§ 541.605 to -665 (1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 2-1-13 to -18 (1976); 
and VA. CeOE §§ 62.1-13.1,62.1-13.5 to -6, 62.1-13.20 (1982). 
5. See e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-36 to -45 (West 1975); N.H. REv. 
STAT. ANN: §§ 483-A:l to -5 (1968); N.Y. ENVIR. CONSERV. LAW §§ 24-0101 to -0705 
(McKinney Supp. 1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 2-1-19 to -25, (1976 and Supp. 1981). 
6. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1452-1464 (1976). Of35 eligible states and territories, 19 have ap­
proved plans as of 1979. For a general overview of federal, state and local laws on this 
subject, see Dawson, Land Use Implications of Wetlands and Floodplain Regulation, 2 
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This article is intended to complement and update Protecting 
Massachusetts Wetlands,7 a lengthy study of the Massachusetts stat­
utes and decisions on wetlands and floodplains prior to 1978, with a 
discussion of cases from other states and an analysis of the impact of 
federal law. It focuses on cases decided by the Massachusetts Ap­
peals Court and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in the 
intervening years, with reference to two important recent decisions 
from other jurisdictions. 
The decisions reported since 1978 further illuminate specific is­
sues: The degree to which a town can protect floodplains through 
zoning bylaws;8 whether Massachusetts communities may protect 
wetlands through home rule nonzoning bylaws;9 and the complexi­
ties of the Commonwealth's Wetlands Protection Act (WPA).l0 The 
first decision under the Commonwealth's Inland Wetlands Restric­
tion Act of 1968 (IWRA)ll and further rulings on the public trust in 
tidal lands 12 are also discussed. 
II. 	 A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE MASSACHUSETTS STATUTORY 
STRUCTURE AND PREVIOUS DECISIONS 
The Commonwealth rejoices in three statutes governing altera­
tion of wetlands. The Coastal Wetlands Restriction Act of 1965 
(CWRA)13 and the IWRA are prospective in operation. Each law 
permits the state Department of Environmental Management to map 
important coastall4 and inlandIS wetlands and, after notice and hear­
ings, to record restrictive orders limiting alteration of the land. The 
two laws permit appeal of the order, within ninety days from record­
ing, on constitutional grounds of excessive restriction.16 Many such 
appeals have been filed, although the first decision of the supreme 
ZONING AND PLANNING L. REPORT 178-82, 185-90. For a much briefer treatment, see 
McGregor & Dawson, Wetlands and Floodplain Protection, 64 MASS. L. REv. 73 (1979). 
7. Dawson, Protecting Massachusetts Wetlands, 12 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 755 (1978). 
8~ See notes 47-65 infra and accompanying text. 
9. See notes 114-34 infra and accompanying text. 
10. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 131, § 40 (West 1974 & Supp. 1982\ see notes 78­
113 infro and accompanying text. 
11. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 131, § 40A (West Supp. 1982); see notes 135-49 
infra and accompanying text. 
12. See notes 150-69 infra and accompanying text. 
13. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 130, § 105 (West Supp. 1982). 
14. Id. ch. 130, § 105. 
15. Id. ch. 131, § 4OA. 
16. Id. & ch. 130, § 105. 
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judicial court on these laws did not come down until 1981.17 Due to 
budget constraints, the prospective laws have not been used exten­
sively, except in some coastal areas. 
The more familiar law, the WPA or Hatch Act, requires no ad­
vance state action; the WP A simply declares that no person shall fill, 
dredge, remove, or alter any defined coastal or inland wetland with­
out a permit from the local conservation commission or from the 
state Department of Environmental Quality Engineering (DEQE) on 
appeal. 18 Because wetlands are defined to include "lands subject to 
flooding," the WPA also protects floodplains. 
The WPA is an outgrowth of the Jones Act and a companion 
law passed in 1965 that requires a state permit for filling or dredging 
inland wetlands. 19 The laws were repealed and combined into the 
WPA in 1972; and original jurisdiction was shifted from the state to 
the local conservation commissions.20 Thousands of hearings are 
held annually under the WP A and about ten percent of the local 
decisions are appealed. Considering the scope and familiarity of the 
law, surprisingly few court decisions have been rendered. This is 
because the series of local and state hearings provide an extensive 
forum. Recently, however, two appeals court cases have been 
decided.21 
Municipalities in Massachusetts have long protected wetlands, 
especially floodplains, through local ordinances and bylaws adopted 
under the Zoning Act22 or, more recently under the home rule 
amendment,23 as general ordinances or bylaws not requiring the 
complex procedures needed for adopting or amending zoning 
17. Moskow v. Commissioner of Environmental Management, 1981 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. 2134,427 N.E.2d 750. Moskow is discussed at text accompanying notes 135-45 infra. 
18. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 131, § 40 (West Supp. 1982). 
19. Act of Mar. 29,1965, ch. 220, § 117 C, 1965 Mass. Acts 116 (repealed 1972). 
20. For regulations adopted under the law, see 310 CODE MAss. REGS. 10.00 
(1980); 45 Mass. Reg. 1-36 (1977). 
21. The two cases, Town of Rutiand v. Fife, 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 308, 416 
N.E.2d 518, rev'tJ, 385 Mass. 1001 (1982) and Hamilton v. Conservation Comm'n, 1981 
Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1521,425 N.E.2d 358 are discussed at text accompanying notes 
78-104 infra. 
22. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 4OA, §§ 1-17 (West 1979 & Supp. 1981). 
23. MASS. CONST. amend. art. II. Prior to the adoption of the home rule amend­
ment, Massachusetts cities and towns were subject to the complete control of the General 
Court. Board of Appeals v. Housing Appeals Comm'n, 363 Mass. 339, 355-56, 294 
N.E.2d 393, 407-08 (1973). The home rule amendment grants cities or towns independ­
ent legislative powers as well as any power or function which the general court has power 
to confer upon it, provided that it is not inconsistent with the constitution or laws enacted 
by the legislature, nor denied by its own charter. MAss. CONST. amend. art. II § 6. 
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codes.24 These local efforts were supported by the requirements of 
the federal flood insurance program, which mandates that participat­
ing communities regulate use of the hundred-year floodplain 
through local enactments.25 Recent cases have tested three such zon­
ing bylaws and one nonzoning bylaw.26 
Of the numerous wetlands and floodplains cases decided before 
1978,27 four are of greatest interest. In Commissioner ofNatural Re­
sources v. S. Volpe & Co. ,28 the first to interpret the WP A, the issue 
was whether denying a permit allowing filling of a march for the 
construction of residences was such a deprivation of the practical 
uses of the landowner's property as to constitute a taking.29 The 
court held that a regulation which goes "too far" is an impermissible 
taking without compensation.30 The application of the test was in­
conclusive in Volpe because the case was remanded for findings, and 
the decision of the superior court on remand was not appealed. Ref­
erence to Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,3l however, indicated a 
conservative tendency in defining public regulatory power.32 
The conservative point of view was given clearer, though not 
definitive expression in MacGibbon v. Board ofAppeals (MacGibbon 
I, 11 & Ill) ,33 in which a prohibition against fill in seven acres of 
coastal wetlands was held to be confiscatory because it left the owner 
no "practical use" of his land.34 In denying rehearing, however, the 
MacGibbon III court stated specifically that, as the case was decided 
under the Zoning Enabling Act, the decisions had no relation to the 
WPA.35 Further, the court stated that its decision did not "discuss or 
24. General bylaws are adopted under MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40, § 21 (West 
1958 and Supp. 1981). 
25. Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4128 (1976). For 
regulations pertaining to the Act, see 44 C.F.R. §§ 60.1-60.26 (1980). 
26. F or a discussion of these cases, see notes 47-76 infra and accompanying text. 
27. :For a discU$ion of these cases, see Dawson, supra note 7. 
28. 349 Mass. 104, 206 N.E.2d 666 (1965). 
29. Id at 107,206 N.E.2d at 669. 
30. Id at 110, 206 N.E.2d at 670 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 
U.S. 393, 415 (1922». 
31. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
32 References to Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 
(1978), or to Agins v. City ofTiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) usually indicate a more liberal 
approach. 
33. MacGibbon III, 369 Mass. 512, 340 N.E.2d 487 (1975), reh'g denied, 369 Mass. 
523, 344 N.E.2d 185 (1976); MacGibbon II, 356 Mass. 635, 255 N.E.2d 347 (1970); 
MacGibbon I, 347 Mass. 690,200 N.E.2d 254 (1964). 
34. MacGibbon Ill, 369 Mass. at 517, 340 N.E.2d at 490-91. 
35. MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals, 369 Mass. 523, 524-25, 344 N.E.2d 185, 186­
87 (1979). 
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decide any constitutional issue whatever."36 
It should be noted that the MacGibbon triad involved that bug­
bear of land regulators, a situation in which all of the landowner's 
property is strictly regulated and rendered economically unusable. 
In upholding regulation in other cases, courts have found the poten­
tial for residual or accessory use of the regulated area, an issue which 
appears in several cases discussed below.37 While Volpe did not in­
volve considerable upland acreage, the case failed to recognize the 
importance of the accessory use issue. As a result, the issue of the 
trial was limited to the effects of filling the coastal wetland. There 
was no discussion of whether the marsh had value for minor acces­
sory uses to the adjacent uplands in the same ownership.38 
In Golden v. Board oj"Selectmen,39 the court established that lo­
cal regulation was not preempted by the state laws covering wet­
lands.40 The court held that state law would be preemptive only if 
the local bylaw was "repugnant to ... [or] inconsistent with" the 
state scheme.41 
Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town oj" Dedham42 is a leading case on 
floodplain restriction. Although Turnpike Realty concerned a local 
floodplain protection bylaw, the court's reasoning applies equally 
well to any level of wetlands regulation. The opinion contains broad 
language supporting regulation of floodplains and emphasizes the 
hazards in permitting their uncontrolled development.43 The total­
loss-of-practical-use problem did not arise in Turnpike Realty be­
cause the landowner had not investigated development possibilities 
of two areas that rose above the floodplain.44 Turnpike Realty 
clearly governs the three most recent Massachusetts floodplain 
cases.4S 
III. RECENT CASES 
The basic issue evident in most of the recent Massachusetts 
cases is one of taking: the amount of environmental regulation of 
36. Id. at 524, 344 N.E.2d at 186. 
37. See Dawson, supra note 7, at 790-92. 
38. 349 Mass. at 110-11,206 N.E.2d at 671. 
39. 358 Mass. 519, 265 N.E.2d 573 (1970). 
40. Id. at 524, 526, 265 N.E.2d at 576, 577. 
41. Id. at 524, 265 N.E.2d at 576. 
42. 362 Mass. 221, 284 N.E.2d 891 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973). 
43. Id. at 227-29, 233-35, 284 N.E.2d at 895-96, 899. 
44. Id. at 223, 235-36, 284 N.E.2d at 893, 899-900. 
45. See text accompanying notes 47-65 infra. 
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private property without compensation that is permissible under the 
state and federal constitutions.46 The constitutional test in Massa­
chusetts appears to be one of balancing. The public hazard con­
trolled by the regulation is balanced against the burden inflicted on 
the landowner. Turnpike Realty continues to be the governing case, 
but MacGibbon III may have an impact on subsequent cases in 
which the landowner asserts that the government restriction has de- . 
prived him of the practical use of his remaining land. Additionally, 
Turnpike Realty seems to have made the courts comfortable with the 
regulation of floodplains even in situations where the exact degree of 
hazard has not been ascertained. 
A. Three Attempted Incursions into the Floodplain 
During 1979 and 1980, the Massachusetts Appeals Court ren­
dered three decisions interpreting local floodplain protection bylaws. 
In Subaru ofNew England, Inc. v. Board ofAppeals,47 the town de­
nied plaintiff a special permit to place fill along the Neponset River. 
The fill would have resulted in a loss of fifteen acre feet of flood­
water storage capacity.48 Testimony indicated'that this loss would 
result in a rise of one quarter of an inch in the flood stage of the river 
related to the maximum area of the floodplain zone.49 The trial 
court found the effect minimal and concluded that the town acted 
unreasonably and arbitrarily in refusing to grant Subaru a permit. so 
In reversing the trial court, the appeals court held that as "reason­
able persons could differ as to the severity of danger from flooding 
... the board's decision was not arbitrary and must prevail."Sl 
Thus, because the local board showed some basis for its decision, the 
court refused to substitute its opinion for that of the board's.s2 The 
court's decision in MacGibbon III directing the board to issue a per­
mit was distinguished on the ground that in the case at bar, filling 
would cause water to flow over the land of others, not merely the 
landowner's property. 53 The opinion shows a distinct disposition to 
follow Turnpike Realty rather than the MacGibbon reasoning. 
46. See Volpe, 349 Mass. at 107-10,206 N.E.2d at 669-70. 
47. 8 Mass. App. Ct. 483, 395 N.E.2d 880 (1979). 
48. Id at 485, 395 N.E.2d at 882. 
49. Id at 485-86, 395 N.E.2d at 882. The rise of one quarter of an inch, however, 
may have represented the rise to be expected if the entire floodplain of 825 acres were 
filled, not plaintiffs 2.98 acres. Id at 486 n.4, 395 N.E.2d at 882 n.4. 
50. Id at 486, 395 N.E.2d at 882. 
51. Id at 488, 395 N.E.2d at 883. 
52. Id, 395 N.E.2d at 883. 
53. Id at 487 n.5, 395 N.E.2d at 882 n.5. 
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In Turner v. Town of Walpole,54 the appeals court summarily 
upheld the floodplain bylaw of Walpole against a claim that it was 
confiscatory as applied to the landowner. 55 What is interesting about 
the case is that Judge Kass declared that Turnpike Realty, cited six 
times in his brief opinion, clearly governed, although the Walpole 
bylaw lacked any provision for individual review of applications to 
build residential or commercial buildings. 56 In effect, special permits 
were available only for industrial uses. The court felt that this was a 
reasonable distinction. It is not clear from the opinion what zoning 
governed plaintiffs property. The case, however, appeared to 
demonstrate that the availability of the special permit procedure, 
greatly emphasized in Turnpike Realty,57 may not be constitutionally 
required. 
The third decision, also written by Judge Kass, upheld denial by 
the Concord Board of Appeals of a special permit to fill land in the 
floodplain of the Assabet River. In S. Kemble Fischer Realty Trust v. 
Board ofAppeals,58 the trial court found that the proposed filling of 
an old canal in the floodplain would have a number of adverse 
effects: 
[T]he proposed filling of a canal by the plaintiff would defeat the 
drainage function which the canal served; the velocity of water 
flow over a dam in the Assabet River would be increased such that 
erosion of an existing dam, washing out of existing fill and a 
change in the course of the Assabet River were likely; compensa­
tory water storage in the locus would be reduced; the land of 
others would be adversely affected; and filling the upstream end of 
the canal would contribute to stagnation and pollution in the 
downstream unfilled end, causing detriment to the public health. 59 
In view of the findings, the result was to be expected. The decision, 
however, is interesting for its treatment of the taking issue. Plaintiff 
asserted that it was left with no practical use of its property.60 The 
court declared that, after Turnpike Realty, ''the prospects for the 
plaintiffs assault on this score are meager. That decision forecloses 
the argument that the exceedingly limited use which a flood plain 
54. 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1745,409 N.E.2d 807. 
55. Id at 1745, 409 N.E.2d at 808. 
56. Id at 1746, 409 N.E.2d at 808. 
57. 362 Mass. at 230,284 N.E.2d at 897. 
58. 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 637,402 N.E.2d 100. 
59. Id at 639-40, 402 N.E.2d at 102. The court remarked that "(t]his sampling of 
the judge's findings does not exhaust his compilation of what was likely to go wrong if 
the plaintiff obtained the permit it wanted." Id at 640, 402 N.E.2d at 102. 
60. Id at 641, 402 N.E.2d at 103. 
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zoning by-law may leave to the owner of land constitutes a defacto 
taking."61 Plaintiff pointed out that the trial judge himself had 
found that plaintiff could not use its land in its present condition for 
any of the uses permitted within the Flood Plain Conservancy Dis­
triCt.62 The trial judge, however, also had found "that the plaintiffs 
land was not worthless. . ..."63 The appeals court speculated that it 
was "by no means clear from the record that the plaintiff could not 
use that portion of its land in the flood plain zone for some purpose 
which did not require filling, for example to enhance that portion of 
its land which is outside the flood plain."64 Although the town suc­
ceeded on that conjecture, the decision provides a useful caution on 
the importance of introducing evidence at trial regarding the pres­
ence or absence of some kind of "residual economic utility."65 Mas­
sachusetts courts are not yet ready to uphold regulation on the basis 
of hazard alone, in the face of total depreciation of value. 
A recent New Hampshire case offers an instructive contrast to 
the three Massachusetts floodplain cases. In Burrows v. City of 
Keene,66 the New Hampshire Supreme Court struck down designa­
tion of plaintiffs property as an unbuildable "conservation district" 
, 	and required payment of damages in inverse condemnation to com­
pensate plaintiff for the loss of value during the period of overregula­
tion.67 The strongly worded opinion discusses the history of 
American and English constitutional law, describing the protection 
in the New Hampshire Constitution against a regulatory taking68 as 
"a principle that lies at the very foundation of civilized society as we 
know it."69 The instructive facts illustrate the regulatory debacle in­
volved in the case. Although the subject area was located in an envi­
ronmentally sensitive area, no mention of this was made as a basis 
for regulation. The planning board, however, in considering the 
proposed subdivision, opined that the land "should be protected as a 
wilderness area."70 Further, the city, in attempting to buy the land, 
refused to pay more than 27,900 dollars, although the property had 






66. 121 N.H. 590,432 A.2d 15 (1981). 
67. Id. at 601, 432 A.2d at 22. 
68. N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. II. 
69. 121 N.H. at 595, 432 A.2d at 18. 
70. 121 N.H. at 600, 432 A.2d at 21. 
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41,406 dollars.71 The conclusion was, to the court, inescapable: 
Rather than regulating land of unique value72 so as to prevent in­
jury to others, the city was merely "attempting to obtain for the pub­
lic the benefit of having this land remain undeveloped as open space 
without paying for that benefit in the constitutional manner."73 
Any visible intent to exercise the police power so as to retain 
developable land in a natural condition almost always is fatal in 
cases involving taking. For example, in Aronson v. Sharon ,74 large­
lot zoning was struck down on the basis of such a stated intent; 
whereas in a later case, lots of similar size were upheld on a showing 
of public health concerns.75 The implications are all the worse if the 
community has previously considered buying the land for open 
space and turns to regulation when the sale falls through.76 
B. Two Tests ofProcedures Under the WPA 
From a simple regulatory law, the WPA has grown to a lengthy 
statute, filed with Latin definitions and administrative procedures, 
and governed by complex and detailed regulations.77 The pitfalls of 
its interpretation are considerable and are demonstrated in two re­
cent cases concerning the towns of Rutland and Orleans. These 
cases reflect the complexities of the language and procedure of the 
WPA, rather than constitutional verities. 
In Town of Rutland v. F![e,78 the only real legal issue was 
whether the land on which defendant Fife wanted to build was a 
wetland as defined in the statute.79 The only evidence the town pro­
duced at trial that touched upon the criteria for a protected wetland 
'Was a letter from an environmental consultant and registered sani­
tarian.80 Because the letter failed to mirror the language of the WPA 
regarding the level of the water table or the incidence of wetland 
71. Id. at 594, 432 A.2d at 17. 
72. Id. at 601, 432 A.2d at 21 (distinguishing Sibson v. State, 115 N.H. 124, 336 
A.2d 239 (1975) in which the court upheld a prohibition on the filling of a coastal 
saltmarsh). 
73. 121 N.H. at 600, 432 A.2d at 21. 

74.. 346 Mass. 598, 195 N.E.2d 341 (1964). 

75. Wilson v. Town of Sherborn, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 237, 326 N.E.2d 922 (1975); see 
also Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 
N.J. 539, 541, 193 A.2d 232, 234 (1963). 
76. See Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy 
Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 544, 193 A.2d 232, 235 (1963); Dawson, supra note 7, at 772-74. 
77. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 131, § 40 (West 1974 and Supp. 1982). 
78. 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 308,416 N.E.2d 518. 
79. ld. at 309, 416 N.E.2d at 519. 
80. ld. at 312-13, 416 N.E.2d at 521. 
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plants, the appeals court granted summary judgement, holding that 
the letter fell short of establishing that the land was a wetland.81 The 
message here for conservation commissions and town attorneys is 
very clear. The court also struggled with the meaning of the statu­
tory requirement that a subject wetland border on surface water.82 
The court stated that the definition of "bordering" in the regulations 
leaves the reader "mired in hopeless circularity ..."83 in that it de­
fines bordering as including land "within '100 feet horizontally land­
ward from the bank of any . . . swamp bordering the . . . pond 
... .'''84 Judge Kass dealt with the circularity by deciding that a 
wetland is subject to the law if any portion of it lies within one hun­
dred feet of a pond, ocean, estuary, creek, river, stream, lake, or land 
subject to tidal action and other flooding, whereas a wetland beyond 
this expanded version of a bank is not subject to the law.85 Fife 
marks the first judicial attempt at reconciling the statutory and regu­
latory definitions of the bordering jurisdiction.86 On appeal, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court determined that the disputed 
letter was "sufficiently substantial. . . to raise an apparent issue of 
fact" and remanded the case for trial. 87 
Hamilton v. Conservation Commission of Or/eans88 also was de­
cided on a single legal point. Plaintiff Hamilton, dissatisfied with the 
decision of the local conservation commission regarding her applica­
tion to build a house by Cape Cod Bay, appealed to the DEQE.89 
The DEQE made a de novo decision under the WPA following an 
adjudicatory hearing.9o Similar to the local conservation commis­
sion, the DEQE prohibited the proposed work unless the work was 
to be constructed on pilings, without a revetment, and with no work 
seaward of twenty feet from the mean high water mark.91 Claiming 
that the conservation commission's decision was confiscatory, plain­
tiff neither sought judicial review within the thirty-day limit under 
81. Id at 314, 416 N.E.2d at 522. 
82. Id at 312, 416 N.E.2d at 520. 
83. Id. at 310, 416 N.E.2d at 520. 
84. Id (quoting 310 CODE MASS. REGS. 10.02(4)&(6) (1980». 
85. 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 311 & n.5, 416 N.E.2d 520 & n.5. 
86. During informal discussions, members of the Massachusetts Association of 
Conservation Commissions have indicated that most conservation commissions interpret 
the regulation to mean that they may control activities within 100 feet from any wetland; 
an area known as the "buffer zone." 
87. 385 Mass. 1001, 1001, 433 N.E.2d 424, 424 (1982). 
88. 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1521,425 N.E.2d 358. 
89. Id at 1522, 425 N.E.2d at 360. 
90. Id at 1523-24, 425 N.E.2d at 361. 
91. Id at 1524, 425 N.E.2d at 361-62. 
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the State Administrative Procedures Act,92 nor did she elect to sue 
the DEQE.93 Plaintiff instead sued the local conservation commis­
sion in inverse condemnation for depriving her of all use of her 
property.94 After a long discussion of the history of the WPA, the 
court concluded that the WPA "reserves to the DEQE the power to 
make the final decision on applications involving the specified con­
cerns and to preserve thereby the statewide interest in the protection 
of our wetlands."9s As the DEQE bears the liability for any taking, 
the case was brought against the wrong party and, therefore, was 
dismissed.96 
The court, however, did state that the plaintiff was able to seek 
redress under the eminent domain law,97 which thus far had been 
considered applicable only to actual takings of property for public 
purposes. This theory of action has several implications. First, it 
establishes an appeal period of two years from the date of the final 
order.98 The WPA states that "[n]o person shall remove, fill, dredge 
or alter any [defined] wetland ... or any land subject to ... flood­
ing . . . without receiving and complying with an order of condi­
tions and provided all appeal periods have elapsed."99 Heretofore, 
these appeal periods generally have been deemed to be the ten day 
period after the local conservation commission has acted or failed to 
act, or the thirty-day period under the State Administrative Proce­
dures Act (APA)IOO after the issuance of a final, superseding order by 
the DEQE. Thus, the question becomes whether Hamilton signifies 
that no one may do work in a subject area for a full two years after a 
state order is issued, for fear of a taking claim. If so, grave difficul­
ties would be presented, as the orders on their face are good only for 
a year. 101 The historical facts show an inadvertence: A provision 
did appear in the WPA naming the APA as the sole remedy on ap­
peal, but this provision was omitted when the law was subjected to a 
total redrafting in 1974.102 The court, however, noted that during 
92. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, § 14 (West 1979). 
93. 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1525, 425 N.E.2d at 362. 
94. Id at 1522,425 N.E.2d at 360. 
95. Id at 1531,425 N.E.2d at 365. 
96. Id at 1532,425 N.E.2d at 366. 
97. Id at 1534,425 N.E.2d at 366 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 79, §§ 16, 18 
(West 1969». 
98. 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1534,425 N.E.2d at 367. 
99. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 131, § 40 (West Supp. 1982) (emphasis added). 
100. Id ch. 30A, §§ 14-17 (West 1979). 
101. 310 CODE MASS. REGS. 10.06(4) (1980). An exception is made under 310 
CODE MAss. REGS. 10.05(9) for dredging of ports. 
102. Act of Aug. 13, 1974, ch. 818, § 40, 1974 Mass. Acts 834. 
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the same legislative session a similar provision was placed into an­
other environmental law. 103 By expressly including an exclusive 
remedy provision in one law and excluding it from the WPA, the 
court concluded that the legislature did not intend to limit the rem­
edy under the WPA. 104 
Hamilton not only extended the limitations period, it also sig­
naled the abandonment of the standard of review under the APA, 
which generally is limited to the question of whether the state agency 
acted arbitrarily. lOS Finally, an action brought under the eminent 
domain statute opens the door towards adoption of the new doctrine, 
recently expressed in a United States Supreme Court minority opin­
ion,I06 that an over-regulated landowner ought to be compensated in 
cash and not merely by the removal of the restriction on the land. 107 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court has adopted this doctrine in 
Burrows. 108 
C. Protection 0/ Wetlands Through Local Home Rule Measures 
Lovequist v. Conservation Commission 109 is interesting for two 
reasons: Its broad statements on taking I 10 and its holding that state 
law does not preempt communities from adopting nonzoning "gen­
eral" environmental protection ordinances and bylaws as well as 
zoning controls. I II Although this kind of local bylaw is not included 
in the statute listing permissible local measures, I 12 the court upheld 
it as authorized by the Commonwealth's home rule amendment. l13 
After Golden, it was improbable that the Massachusetts courts 
would find that the state scheme of wetlands controls preempted lo­
cal controls. What was more uncertain, however, was the degree to 
which the Zoning Act,114 and its predecessor the Zoning Enabling 
Act, lIS might be construed as the exclusive means for regulating wet­
103. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 131, § 39A (West Supp. 1982) (allowing local 
conservation commissions to regulate "scenic mountains" in Berkshire County). 
104. See 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1536-37, 425 N.E.2d at 368. 
105. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, § 14(7)(g) (West 1979). 
106. San Diego Gas and Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981) (Bren­
nan, J., dissenting). 
107. Id at 658. 
108. 121 N.H. at 598-99, 432 A.2d at 19-20. 
109. 379 Mass. 7, 393 N.E.2d 858 (1979). 
110. Id at 19-21, 393 N.E.2d at 866. 

Ill. See id at 11-16, 393 N .E.2d at 861-64. 

112. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40, § 21 (West 1958 & Supp. 1982). 
113. See 379 Mass. at 14-15,393 N.E.2d at 863. 
114. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 4OA, §§ 1-17 (West 1979). 
115. Id §§ 1-22 (West 1968). 
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lands or floodplains. In Rayco Investment Corp. v. Selectmen of 
Raynham,116 the supreme judicial court disapproved the efforts of 
that town to limit the number of trailers by a "general" nonzoning 
bylaw, because the "nature and effect of the 1971 bylaw is that of an 
exercise of the zoning power."117 The Rayco court also showed a 
preference for the use of the zoning power in land use regulations 
because of its comprehensiveness and the assorted protections it af­
forded to landowners. lls 
The Lovequist court distinguished Rayco on two grounds. First, 
the town had not demonstrated a history of comprehensive wetlands 
controls through a zoning bylaw; 119 and second, the bylaw mani­
fested "neither the purpose nor the effects of a zoning regulation." 120 
It did not prohibit or permit any particular uses of land, deny or 
invite permission to build any structure, or regulate density.121 It 
related only to wetlands values, not to other municipal concerns, and 
regulated them on a case-by-case basis. 122 Having passed over this 
hurdle, the court had no trouble finding that regulation by a nonzon­
ing bylaw was as valid as regulation through zoning. 123 Plaintiff, 
however, argued that the use of the local bylaw eliminated an appeal 
to DEQE from a local decision under the WPA.124 The court made 
short work of this argument. It stated that the aggrieved applicant 
still had the right to judicial review in the nature of a writ of certio­
rari.125 It should be noted that Golden did not raise the important 
point that under the WPA the state agency has the last administra­
tive word, whereas under a local bylaw the court directly reviews a 
town decision. If Golden had not been decided first, an interesting 
question arises as to whether the Lovequist court would have been 
more sympathetic to the argument. 
116. 368 Mass. 385, 331 N.E.2d 910 (1975). 
117. Id at 392, 331 N.E.2d at 914. 
118. Id at 393-94, 331 N.E.2d at 915. Presumably the court was referring to the 
greater procedural requirements under the then Zoning Enabling Act, as well as to the 
numerous exeniptions and limitations contained in the law. It is clear from Rayco that 
the town, being unable to use its zoning to stop a plan for a trailer park because of the 
exemption under the Zoning Enabling Act, tried to circumvent this limitation by using 
the general bylaw power. Id 
119. 379 Mass. at 14, 393 N.E.2d at 863. 
120. Id at 13,393 N.E.2d at 862. 
121. Id 
122. Id at 13-16,393 N.E.2d at 863-64. 
123. Id at 15, 393 N.E.2d at 863. 
124. Id at 15, 393 N.E.2d at 863-64. 
125. Id at 16, 393 N.E.2d at 864; see MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 249, § 4 (West 
Supp. 1982). 
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Lovequist involved denial of a permit to'put in a road over a 
marshy neck in order to create access to twenty-six acres of up­
land. 126 Building the road would have required removal of 6,000 
cubic yards of peat, to be replaced with more permeable gravel. I27 
The town conservation commission denied the application on the ba­
sis of groundwater depletion and pollution. That is, removal of the 
peat might act like "taking the plug out of a bathtub,"128 resulting in 
a loss of groundwater. The court upheld the denial even though the 
groundwater was not being used currently as a water supply.129 
In rejecting plaintiffs taking claim, the Lovequist court stated 
that a government decision may deprive an owner of even the most 
beneficial use of property without rendering the action an unconsti­
tutional taking. 130 The court noted that the only evidence of value 
loss due to the restriction of use was a hearsay statement that plain­
tiff had been offered 250,000 dollars for the property if it could be 
developed. l3l In addition, the land had residual use for a single fam­
ily house, a camp, or a cranberry bog. 132 Finally, the court pointed 
out that as plaintiff had paid 38,200 dollars for the property which 
recently had been appraised for 122,000 dollars, plaintiff would real­
ize a gain of over two-hundred percent if he immediately sold the 
property. \33 The manner and limits of these findings contain valua­
ble lessons for attorneys on both sides of a taking case, particularly 
the court's comment that "the plaintiffs themselves presented little 
evidence of projected loss."134 
D. First Impression ofthe Inland Wetlands Restriction Act 
Moskow v. Commissioner of Environmental Management 135 is 
the first decision under either the coastall36 or the inland 137 wetlands 
restriction laws. The opinion followed the reasoning of Lovequist 
and extensively quoted Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York 
126. 379 Mass. at 9, 393 N.E.2d at 860. 
127. Id at 18, 393 N.E.2d at 865. 
128. Id 
129. Id at 18-19 & 19 n.12, 393 N.E.2d at 865 & 865 n.12. 
130. Id at 19,393 N.E.2d at 866. 
131. Id at 20,393 N.E.2d at 866. 
132. Id 
133. Id at 20-21, 393 N.E.2d at 866. It was not clear, however, whether the ap­
praisal reflected expectations of development.' 
134. Id at 20, 393 N.E.2d at 866. 
135. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2134, 427 N.E.2d 750. 
136. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 130, § 105 (West Supp. 1981). 
137. Id at ch. 131, § 40A (West Supp. 1981). 
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City.138 The Moskow court focused on two points: That "diminu­
tion in value" is not in itself a taking 139 and that the value of the 
owner's property as a whole must be considered, not merely the 
value of the restricted portion. 140 
In Moskow, plaintiff owned about seven and one-half acres of 
land in densely developed Newton. 141 The Commonwealth's restric­
tive order limited use of about four acres to recreation, wharves and 
other boating uses, and utility lines. 142 The trial court determined 
the restrictive order confiscatory, in part because without the restric­
tion plaintiff could have subdivided the land into eight lotS. 143 The 
supreme judicial court, however, found that the residual utility of the 
land as a site for one, single family dwel.liri.g presented a "sufficient 
practical use to prevent the wetland restrictions from constituting a 
taking."I44 It is worth noting that, once again, "[t]he plaintiff offered 
no evidence which showed that he suffered an actual financial loss as 
a result of the restrictions."145 
The floodplain protection byiaw considered in Turnpike Re­
alty 146 had three purposes: To protect the owner's land; to protect 
upstream and downstream land; and to protect "the entire commu­
nity from individual choices of land use which require subsequent 
public expenditures for public works and disaster relief."147 The 
third purpose, which might be objectionable to those who believe 
that a community cannot use the zoning power simply to avoid pub­
lic expenditures,148 was not discussed in Turnpike Realty. The court, 
however, did approve the bylaw. In view of this distinction, it is 
interesting that the Moskow court extended the principle of the Ded­
ham bylaw to the inland wetlands restriction act which, it stated, 
. "helps society avoid the relief expenditures connected with flooding 
138. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
139. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2137-38 n.3, 427 N.E.2d at 753 n.3. 
140. Id at 2137, 427 N.E.2d at 753. 
141. Id at 2135, 427 N.E.2d at 751. 
142. Id at 2135-36, 427 N.E.2d at 752. 
143. Id at 2137, 427 N.E.2d at 752. 
144. Id, 427 N.E.2d at 753 (citing Lovequist, 379 Mass. 7, 393 N.E.2d 866 (1979». 
145. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2137-38 n.3, 427 N.E.2d at 753 n.3. 
146. Turnpike Realty, 362 Mass. at 227, 284 N.E.2d at 896. 
147. 362 Mass. at 228, 284 N.E.2d at 896. 
148. See e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 
67 N.J. 151,336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975) (town zoning must pro­
vide for a fair share of low-cost housing despite local costs); Simon v. Needham, 311 
Mass. 560, 565, 42 N.E.2d 516, 519 (1942) (zoning bylaws cannot be adopted for the 
purpose of setting up a barrier against the infiux of thrifty and respectable citizens). 
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and pollution control."149 
E. Further Evidence on the Public Trust in Tidal Lands 
State and federal laws have given special protection to areas 
subject to the "public trust" doctrine, ISO especially coastal areas be­
low mean high or, in Massachusetts, mean low tidal lines. The pub­
lic trust was the basis of the famous Just v. Marinette Co. ,151 in which 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld a prohibition on the filling of a 
freshwater coastal marsh. The court held that as the shorelands of 
Wisconsin were held under a public trust to protect navigable wa­
ters, an owner of such land could not claim compensation for gov­
ernment exercise of a servitude that interfered with his private use. IS2 
Similarly, in Zabel v. Tabb,ls3 the Fifth Circuit held that the federal 
servitude to which coastal areas lS4 are subject also bars any compen­
sation to landowners affected by restrictions on the use of such 
land. ISS 
In Massachusetts, the public trust over areas below mean low 
water level has developed over a period of many years: IS6 The issue 
has been brought into prominence by the dispute over title to filled 
land in the valuable Boston harbor area. IS7 Most recently the 
supreme judicial court has declared that "[a]s to submerged lands 
... no littoral landowner or anyone else has any special rights un­
less granted them by the Legislature."ls8 The disposition of such 
lands by the legislature must be for a public purpose only.ls9 Thus, 
the issue is of continued interest in the Commonwealth. 
149. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2139 n.4, 427 N.E.2d at 754 n.4. 
150. For a general discussion of the "public trust" doctrine, see Dawson, supra 
note 7, at 781-90. 
151. 56 Wis. 2d 7,201 N.W.2d 761 (1972). See also Sibson v. State, 115 N.H. 124, 
130, 336 A.2d 239, 243, (1972) (citing Just in upholding prohibition of fill in a tidal 
wetland). 
152. 56 Wis. 2d at 19,201 N.W.2d at 769. 
153. 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971). 
154. In Zabel, the coastal area in question was a Florida mangrove swamp. Id. at 
215. 
155. Id. 
156. For a discussion of the early history of "public trust" doctrine in Massachu­
setts, see Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1851); Dawson, supra note 7, at 
781-85. 
157. See Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 214, 
374 N.E.2d 598 (1978), affd, 378 Mass. 629, 393 N.E.2d 356 (1979). 
158. Opinion of the Justices, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1361, 1369, 424 N.E.2d 1092, 
1099; 
i59. Id. at 1371, 424 N.E.2d at 1100. 
639 1982] WETLANDS AND FLOODPLAINS REVISITED 
In Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 160 the Florida Supreme 
Court gave powerful expression to the public trust in protecting 
coastal mangrove swamps. Estuary owned approximately 6,500 
acres of land on the southwest coast, less than ten percent of which 
was nonwetlands. 161 It sought to convert 1,800 acres of black man­
groves, adjacent to 2,800 acres of tidal red mangroves, into a large 
residential and commercial center. 162 The local board of county 
commissioners and the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Com­
mission refused to allow the project, on the grounds of degradation 
. of adjacent bays. 163 The court upheld the denial, citing Just and not­
ing the "close proximity of the land in question to navigable waters 
which the state holds in trust for the public."I64 
In considering taking, the Graham court emphasized two points. 
First, it pointed out that the land was bought by Estuary with "full 
knowledge that part of it was totally unsuitable for development."165 
Second, the court distinguished other Florida cases in which land­
owners had prevailed because "all of the owners' lands were sub­
merged and were totally useless without the right to fill them."166 
Estuary's land, however, was "not entirely submerged."167 Further­
more, Estuary's claim that it would make no beneficial use of the 
nonsubmerged part of its property was "supported mainly by the 
self-serving testimony of the president of Estuary ...."168 The 
company "offered no independent evidence to support this conten­
tion."169 In spite of the ninety-to-ten ratio between regulated and 
unregulated land, the "residual use" argument once again was de­
cided in favor of the regulators, in part because of the absence of 
competent evidence of total deprivation of practical use. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Despite claims of diminished land value, recent Massachusetts 
cases show the continued force of the Turnpike Realty doctrine in 
160. 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1981). 
161. Id at 1376. 
162. Id 
163. Id at 1376-77. 
164. Id at 1382. 
165. Id This reasoning would apply equally well to anyone buying a Massachu­
setts wetland, especially land subject to recorded restrictions under any of the three wet­
lands laws or the Scenic Rivers Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21, § 17A (West 1981). 
166. 399 So. 2d at 1381. 
167. Id 
168. Id at 1382. 
169. Id 
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upholding regulation of floodplains and wetlands, providing that the 
regulation is applied properly to the land and the owner fails to 
prove that the property has no residual practical value. Courts gen­
erally are becoming more knowledgeable about the ecological value 
of wetlands, especially coastal marshes, and the hazards from devel­
opment of floodplains. A strong minority surge of support for the 
position that compensation should accompany regulation makes it 
more imperative than ever that some practical use of the land, how­
ever reduced, be left to the landowner. 
